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Digest: People v. Ramirez
Darrell J. Greenwald
Opinion by Corrigan, J., expressing the unanimous view of
the court.
Issue
Is the crime of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm under
section 246.3(a) of the California Penal Code1 a necessarily
lesser-included offense of the crime of discharge of a firearm at
an inhabited dwelling under section 246 of the California Penal
Code?2
Facts
Police responded to an apartment where a man was
reportedly holding a gun to a woman’s head.3 When ordered
outside by the police, Defendant, Jessie Jose Ramirez, fired
several shots from a shotgun out of the front and rear windows of
In all, ten spent shells were found in
the apartment.4

1 In full, section 246.3(a) reads:
Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a
firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a
person is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 246.3(a) (West 2009).
2 In full, section 246 reads:
Any person who shall maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor vehicle, occupied
aircraft, inhabited housecar, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, or
inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the vehicle Code, is guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a
term of not less than six months and not exceeding one year. [¶] As used in
this section, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for dwelling purposes,
whether occupied or not.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (West 2009).
3 People v. Ramirez, 201 P.3d 466, 467 (Cal. 2009).
4 Id. at 467–68. After police identified themselves, knocked on the door and ordered
the occupants out, a shotgun was fired through the window knocking one officer
backwards and spraying him with glass. Id. at 467. Once the officers took cover, several
more shots were fired through the window, as well as from a rear window. Police again
ordered the occupants out of the apartment. Id. The defendant’s wife, Samantha, and
their five-year-old daughter, came out first. Id. at 467–68. As Samantha emerged, she
told officers that the defendant had put down his gun. Id. at 468. Then the defendant,
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Defendant’s apartment.5 Although no one was struck by any of
the rounds fired by Defendant, several of the shots struck three
neighboring apartments.6
Defendant was convicted, inter alia, of “ten counts of grossly
negligent shooting and three counts of shooting at an inhabited
dwelling.”7 He was sentenced to fifteen years to life, plus thirty
years and four months.8 On appeal, Defendant argued that three
of the grossly negligent shooting convictions must be reversed
because that crime is a necessarily lesser-included offense of
shooting at an inhabited dwelling.9 The Court of Appeal affirmed
Defendant’s convictions.10 The Supreme Court of California
granted Defendant’s appeal from the appellate court’s decision.11
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the parties agreed that three of the
grossly negligent shooting counts and the three counts of
shooting at an inhabited dwelling were based on the same acts.12
Then the Court observed that under section 954 of the California
Penal Code, “a single act or course of conduct can lead to
convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged,’”13 but added
that a judicially created exception to section 954 prohibits
multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.14
The court identified “two tests for determining whether one
offense is necessarily included in another: the ‘elements’ test and
the ‘accusatory pleading test,’”15 but noted that only the statutory
elements test was proper for “deciding whether a defendant may
be convicted of multiple charged crimes.”16 The court settled on
the “elements” test for deciding the case at bar because, here, the

Jessie Jose Ramirez, came out of the apartment with his hands up. Id. As the defendant
exited he told the officers, “I’m your man, the gun’s on the couch.” Id.
5 Id. at 468.
6 Id. One of the shotgun slugs fired pierced three walls of another apartment and
was directed at a bedroom where an eight-month-old baby was sleeping. Id. Another slug
broke the window to a different apartment, hit the living room wall, and caused minor
injuries to the occupant. Id.
7 Id.
The defendant was also convicted of the attempted deliberate and
premeditated murder of a police officer, assault with a firearm upon a police officer, being
a felon in possession of a firearm, and child endangerment. Id. at 468 n.4.
8 Ramirez, at 468.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 954).
14 Id. at 468 (referencing People v. Ortega, 968 P.2d 48 (Cal. 1998) and People v.
Pearson, 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986)).
15 Id. (referencing People v. Lopez, 965 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1998)).
16 Id. (citing People v. Reed, 137 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2006)).
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case involved “the conviction of multiple alternative charged
offenses.”17
The court observed that the “elements” test looks strictly to
the statutory elements, not to the specific facts of a given case.18
The test is “whether all the statutory elements of the lesser
offense are included within those of the greater offense . . . if a
crime cannot be committed without also committing a lesser
offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.”19 On this
basis, Defendant argued that “the crime of shooting at an
inhabited dwelling (§ 246) cannot be committed without also
The
committing a grossly negligent shooting (§ 246(a)).”20
Attorney General countered that unlike section 246, the
language section 246.3(a) requires “the actual presence of a
person in harm’s way.”21
Applying the “elements” test to the case at bar, the court
found that section 246 requires the following elements: “(1)
acting willfully and maliciously, and (2) shooting at an inhabited
house.”22 Next, it recognized that section 246.3(a) requires the
following elements: “(1) the defendant unlawfully discharged a
firearm; (2) the defendant did so intentionally; (3) the defendant
did so in a grossly negligent manner which could result in the
injury or death of a person.”23
First, the court dismissed the Attorney General’s argument,
reasoning that the plain language and legislative history of the
statute confirm that section 246.3(a) requires the likely presence
of people in the area and not “that an actual person be in
proximity to the grossly negligent shooting.”24 Second, the Court
compared the elements of both offenses and found that
“[a]lthough the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently
described, both are general intent crimes” and both offenses
“require that the defendant willfully fire a gun.”25 The court also
reasoned that the offense of shooting at an inhabited building
under section 246 is “grossly negligent because a significant risk

Id.
Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 469.
21 Id. In support of his argument, the Attorney General pointed to the following
italicized language in section 246.3(a): “Except as otherwise authorized by law, any
person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could
result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense . . . .” Id. (citing CAL.
PENAL CODE § 246.3(a)(italics added)).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 469–72.
25 Id. at 472.
17
18
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of injury or death is foreseeable.”26 It then declared that “the
high probability of human death or personal injury in section 246
is similar to, although greater than, the formulation of likelihood
in section 246.3(a), which requires that injury or death ‘could
result.’”27 Finally, the court found that the only “difference
between the two, and the basis for the more serious treatment of
a section 246 offense, is that the greater offense requires that an
inhabited dwelling or other specified object be within the
defendant’s firing range.”28 Thus, the court concluded that all
the elements of section 246.3(a) are necessarily included in the
more stringent requirements of section 246.29 Accordingly, the
court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
remanded with directions to reverse three of the grossly
negligent shooting counts against Defendant.30
Holding
The court held that grossly negligent discharge of a firearm
under section 246.3(a) of the California Penal Code is a
necessarily lesser-included offense of discharge of a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling under section 246 of the California Penal
Code.31
Legal Significance
As a result of this case, a defendant may not be convicted
under both section 246 and section 246.3(a) of the California
Penal Code if both charges are based on the same act(s) of the
defendant because the latter is a necessarily lesser-included
offense of the former.

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 469.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

